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Abstract: In the past decade, Australia has begun to privatize its irrigation system.
Two general models have emerged: a single and a dual ownership structure. This
paper examines the trade-offs, costs and benefits, and the attendant efficiencies
regarding costs of ownership. In particular, we examine member capital
investment incentives and resultant risk-bearing costs related to capital formation.
The paper concludes that the dual ownership structure system has significant
economic advantages relative to its single-structured counterpart.
1. Introduction
Australia is highly dependent upon irrigation water for agricultural production
and profitability. Although the country’s irrigated area is less than 1% of its
total agricultural area, it generates 28% of total agricultural production and
51% of total agricultural profit (CSRIO, 2005). Historically, irrigation water
supply services schemes have been developed and operated by state governments,
often delivering poor financial, resource allocation, and environmental outcomes
(Saleth and Dinar, 1999, 2004; Department of Natural Resources and
Environment, 2001). As a result, New South Wales (NSW) and Western
Australia (WA) transferred their irrigation schemes to local ownership with
subsequent improvements in financial and environmental outcomes (Marsden
Jacob Associates, 2004; Irrigation Review Steering Committee, 2005).
This paper examines in detail one of the two general ownership structures
that have emerged after the privatization of these schemes: the dual ownership
governance structure. In NSW, most locally owned, privatized irrigation schemes
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are formed under federal corporation law but are effectively run and operated
as cooperatives since cooperative principles are built into their constitutions and
bylaws, including: (i) each member (i.e., customer or user) has a single vote;
(ii) the organizations are user-customer focused; and (iii) water entitlements are
tied to member ownership (i.e., shareholding) in the firm. These ‘corporate’
cooperatives are single-structured entities that do not separate asset ownership,
maintenance and management of water functions. However, irrigation schemes
in WA adopted the dual ownership structure to improve their operating
and financial performance. The dual structure separates asset ownership and
maintenance from water services and provision management. These entities are
structured into a common law mutual and a trading cooperative respectively.
The first irrigation scheme to transfer to local ownership and adopt the dual
structure was Harvey Water in WA in 1996; in NSW, Coleambally, the last
scheme to adopt local ownership, adopted the dual structure in 2000.1
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the organizational efficiency
implications, through property rights and ownership costs perspectives, of
Harvey and Coleambally’s dual governance entities. More specifically, we
examine whether these structures are successful in ameliorating the capital
formation constraint (also known as the under-investment problem) of
traditional, single-structured cooperatives. Theory and empirical evidence
suggest that capital formation constraints exist in traditionally structured
agricultural cooperatives as a result of high risk-bearing costs (Cook, 1995;
Hansmann, 1996; Chaddad et al., 2005). The two dual structure irrigation
cooperatives, however, have invested heavily in water-saving technologies,
suggesting lower risk-bearing costs.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the property
rights and ownership costs approaches to organizational efficiency, focusing on
risk-bearing costs and the associated capital formation problem. Subsequently,
Section 3 describes the organizational characteristics of the two dual-structured
irrigation cooperatives (HarveyWater inWA and Coleambally in NSW) and also
1 Instead of adopting the single structure model that had characterized the earlier transfers to local
ownership in NSW, Harvey irrigators decided to commission research to evaluate an alternative model to
better safeguard their fixed asset investment. The other WA irrigation schemes subsequently adopted this
dual structure when transferring to local ownership in the late 1990s. Coleambally, unlike other NSW
schemes, had the choice of working examples of the single and dual models when it transferred ownership
to its irrigators in 2000. Our choice of the two cooperatives under study also highlights the importance
of an external secondary market for water. Harvey Water is able to trade its water savings to the Perth
metropolitan region and Coleambally is able to on-sell its water savings to users with high fixed use needs
(horticulture and livestock) elsewhere in theMurray River system. Coleambally’s predominate production
mix of annual crops (rice and cotton) is suited to the high variability of flows along the Murray-Darling
River system in that these crops can be grown opportunistically. Harvey’s stable climate is better suited
to a higher proportion of livestock and increasingly horticulture. Crucially, however, we argue that the
internal organizational design of the dual structure provides incentives to generate internal investment to
capture opportunities arising from external demand for water.
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analyses the economic benefits of (or reasons for) adopting the dual structure and
the resultant outcomes of increased investment in water-saving technologies, and
subsequent trading of saved water to other users. Section 4 provides an analysis
of the dual structure, in particular how it ameliorates the free-rider, horizon, and
portfolio problems that are oft-cited causes of financial constraints in traditional
cooperatives. In doing so, we attempt to provide a clear connection between
the theoretical predictions outlined in Section 2 and the investment outcomes
observed in two dual-structured irrigation cooperatives in Australia. Concluding
remarks follow.
2. Property rights, ownership costs and organizational efficiency
Alternative ownership forms – e.g., investor-owned, patron-owned, or mutual
firms – are characterized by the way property rights are assigned to ‘owners’.
Several authors have argued that aligning residual rights of control with residual
claimant rights leads to an efficient use of assets (Grossman and Hart, 1986;
Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Hart, 1995). Residual claimants are those able
to receive the net income generated by an asset or bundle of assets such as a
firm. Residual control refers to the rights to make any decision concerning an
asset’s use that are not explicitly specified by law or assigned to another party
by contract. They act as the default rules to the use of an asset. By pursuing their
own self-interest, residual claimants tend to make efficient residual decisions
regarding the use of the firm’s resources because they bear the full wealth effects
of their decisions.
However, when one party is assigned control of property rights that affect
another party’s wealth, decision makers do not bear the full wealth effect of
their decisions. This implies scope for conflicts of interest. Cook (1995) and
Hansmann (1996) provide complementary frameworks for our understanding
of these conflicts of interest and the consequent costs of ownership2 in
patron-owned firms. Cook’s (1995) life cycle approach to the evolution of
agricultural cooperatives focuses on the conflicts that commonly arise between
members pursuing different strategies to maximize their farm wealth within
traditionally structured cooperative organizations. Worldwide, variants of the
traditional structure are the most common form of cooperation in agriculture.
The traditional structure consists of open membership, non-appreciable, non-
transferable, and (partly) redeemable shares and capital accumulation via
retained earnings.
2 According to Hansmann (1996: 21), ‘ownership involves costs. Some of these costs are what might
be called governance costs; they include the costs of making collective decisions among the owners, the
costs of monitoring managers, and the costs of the poor decisions and excessive managerial discretion . . .
Another cost is the risk bearing associated with receipt of residual earnings.’
264 BRADLEY PLUNKETT, FABIO R. CHADDAD AND MICHAEL L . COOK
One major cost of ownership in patron-owned organizations (i.e.,
cooperatives) is related to risk bearing, i.e. ‘the cost of bearing important
risks associated with the enterprise, since those risks are often reflected in the
firm’s residual earnings’ (Hansmann, 1996: 44). The higher these risk-bearing
costs are, the more difficulty the organization has to raise risk capital from
owners (i.e., patrons or members) to fund investment. The capital constraint
problem in user-owned organizations – that is, their inability to acquire sufficient
risk capital to finance investment projects – is usually explained on the basis
of the following arguments: (i) cooperative residual claims are restricted; (ii)
cooperative members do not have appropriate incentives to invest; (iii) equity
capital acquisition in traditional cooperatives is tied to member patronage (with
consequent dependence on internally generated capital); and (iv) cooperative
equity capital is not permanent.
The first argument supporting the capital constraint problem is that
cooperatives have restricted residual claims (Fama and Jensen, 1983). User (or
patron) ownership limits the extent of agent markets for risk bearing and capital
provision since only active members may provide the cooperative organization
with voting equity capital. As a result, risk capital acquisition in the traditional
cooperative firm is limited by the number, the wealth, and the risk-bearing
capacity of member patrons. Since modern agriculture is a capital-intensive
business and farming returns are positively correlated to cooperative upstream
and downstream returns, producer members may be at a disadvantage and thus
incur relatively high risk-bearing costs to supply capital (Hansmann, 1996).
Another restriction on cooperative residual claim rights is their lack of
alienability. Residual claims to the firm’s net cash flows are non-transferable
in the traditional cooperative, which prevents the functioning of a secondary
market for cooperative shares. Voluntary contractual restrictions on residual
claim alienability may not be efficient in organizations where the ‘capital value
problem’ is important, that is when productive activities are supported by large
quantities of long-term assets that are difficult to value (Fama and Jensen,
1985). The non-transferability of cooperative residual claims may result in
the emergence of portfolio and horizon problems. Since members can neither
capture the long-term payoffs of their risky investments in cooperatives due to
the horizon problem nor adjust their investment portfolios to match individual
risk preferences due to the portfolio problem, they tend to influence cooperative
investment decisions and restrict the supply of capital (Jensen and Meckling,
1979; Cook, 1995).
An additional factor affecting the ability of cooperatives to raise capital is that
the property rights allocation within the traditional cooperative structure may
not provide members with the necessary incentives to invest (Vitaliano, 1983;
LeVay, 1983; Cook and Iliopoulos, 2000). Because cooperatives return earnings
to members on the basis of patronage (in the form of patronage allocations)
instead of dividends, cooperatives generally pay low – and often zero – returns on
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capital, which impacts negatively on investment when member capital provision
is not tied to patronage. In addition, residual claims in traditional cooperatives
are not appreciable since they are non-transferable, and redeemable only at
book value. Consequently, members derive benefits from the cooperative mainly
through usage and patronage refunds. The free-rider problem thus emerges, as
patrons share in the return on cooperative equity capital whether or not they
invest in the cooperative (Knoeber and Baumer, 1983).
Disincentives for direct member investment in traditional cooperatives result
in their dependence on internally generated capital and any additional earnings
from non-member business to raise permanent equity capital. In particular,
traditional cooperatives rely primarily on patronage-basedmethods for acquiring
risk capital, that is retained patronage refunds and per unit capital retains.
However, the user-ownership principle may hinder the cooperative’s ability
to generate earnings, as it strives to maximize returns to members if horizon,
portfolio and free-rider problems are allowed to emerge (Staatz, 1987).
As a result of the dependence on internally generated capital, a high proportion
of equity capital in a cooperative’s balance sheet may be allocated to individual
members, representing a claim against the cooperative by present and former
members who still have retained patronage refunds in the firm. This claim is
redeemable, with the ultimate payments to members being at the discretion of the
board of directors. Because redeeming equity is a cash outlay to the cooperative,
equity capital may not be permanent if allocated equity is a large proportion of
total equity.
As a consequence of the nature of their residual claims, cooperatives may
incur relatively high risk-bearing costs and therefore be constrained in acquiring
risk capital for investment purposes. That is, the nature of residual claims in
cooperatives can be a source of organization inefficiency – i.e., higher ownership
costs – relative to competing forms of ownership (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Cook,
1995; Hansmann, 1996). Recent empirical evidence suggests the presence of
financial constraints in a sample of US agricultural cooperatives with traditional
ownership structure (Chaddad et al., 2005). In the next section, we describe the
ownership and organizational characteristics of non-traditional, dual-structured
irrigation cooperatives in Australia and examine how they might ameliorate the
risk-bearing costs of their traditional counterparts.
3. The privatization of irrigation schemes: local ownership, self-funded
investment and water trading
Situated 140 km south of Perth, WA and settled around 100 years ago, the
Harvey area’s predominant land uses are dairy and beef, with the balance
consisting mainly of horticulture (Economic Consulting Service, 2006). Water
is sourced from catchments in neighbouring hills and the irrigation scheme area
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is around 112,000 ha, of which about 10,000 ha are currently irrigated from a
possible 35,000 ha (State Water Strategy, 2005).
The Coleambally scheme, located 620 km west of Sydney and 420 km north
of Melbourne, was the last irrigation system developed on the Murray–Darling–
Murrumbidgee River systems in the late 1950s. It consists of around 80,000
ha of intensive irrigation (e.g. crops such as rice and chickpeas), 40,000 ha of
mixed irrigation, dry-land farms, and 300,000 ha of outfall district stations with
grazing and opportunistic irrigation in very wet years. The development of higher
value crops was restricted until the 1980s to avoid competitive pressure on other
irrigation schemes along the Murray River system.
Not unlike other irrigation schemes in Australia, Harvey Water and
Coleambally were originally organized as state-owned enterprises. Problems
related to past development approaches guiding the water sector – leading
to water overexploitation and over-allocation – and emerging pressures from
urban growth and environmental sustainability have led to water institutional
reforms in Australia since 1995 (McKay, 2005). One important aspect of recent
Australian water institutional reform is privatization of water irrigation schemes.
By divesting themselves of service delivery, state governments are better able
to impose tighter licensing obligations on to the newly privatized irrigators.
A condition of bulk water licences issued to Coleambally, for instance, is the
implementation of community developed land and water management plans,
which are integrated into the Murrumbidgee Catchment Management Plan.
Similarly, Harvey Water’s bulk water allocation is tied to regulatory conditions
stipulated by the Department of Water and the Economic Regulation Authority
in WA.
Tight matching regulatory controls have, in turn, been imposed on individual
irrigators as a consequence of their cooperative ownership. For example,
Harvey Water’s legal right to bulk water is transferred to owners who have
an equity entitlement to water via their shareholding in the cooperative. More
specifically, members’ ownership rights in the cooperative are proportional to
their individual water allocation. In keeping with the Council of Australian
Government’s (COAG) 1994 policy framework,3 the introduction of privately
owned structures provides a means for separating water ownership entitlements
from land titles and consequently for water to be traded internally by members;
that is, transferable water entitlement certificates (TWE), outlining the conditions
under which water is delivered, are ‘stapled’ (i.e., tied) to member’s shares.
Some members have accessed the inherent value of their water entitlements
by borrowing against their shares, with the encumbrance registered on the
3 The objective of COAG’s framework was to move urban and rural water use towards ‘full cost
recovery, separation of water access rights from land title, trading of water rights to allow water to move
to more efficient uses, and the need for specific provision of water for the environment’ (Australian Senate,
2007).
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cooperative registers. The cooperatives are also able to trade their own water
entitlements issued for the purpose of conveying water to members’ properties
if they are able to invest in water-saving technologies to reduce channel leaks,
seepage, and water evaporation. However, they cannot sell or encumber water
entitlements within the bulk entitlements owned by their members.
Organizational characteristics of the dual structure irrigation cooperatives
Table 1 exhibits the differences in residual claim characteristics between an
investor-owned corporation, a traditional single-structured cooperative, the
single-structured irrigation corporation cooperative, and the dual ownership
structure adopted by the irrigation schemes under study in this paper. Both
irrigation schemes under study were transferred to user-owned organizations
formed under respective State cooperative law. The HarveyWater asset mutual –
known as the South West Irrigation Asset Cooperative (SWIAC) – assumed
ownership of irrigation assets upon transfer to local ownership in 1996.
On transfer to local ownership, the assets of the Coleambally scheme were
transferred to the trading cooperative. The asset mutual – called Coleambally
Irrigation Mutual Cooperative Limited (CIMCL) – will assume ownership of
all of Coleambally’s assets over time, as they are replaced using CIMCL funds.
The respective trading cooperatives are the South West Irrigation Management
Cooperative Ltd (SWIMCO, trading as Harvey Water) and Coleambally
Irrigation Cooperative Ltd (CICL). Figure 1 presents the key design features
and main functions of the dual structure adopted by Coleambally and Harvey
Water.
Although each set of trading and mutual cooperatives share a common
membership, the two entities operate with totally separate independent boards.
In the Harvey Water cooperatives (SWIAC and SWIMCO) and in Coleambally’s
trading cooperative (CICL), shareholdings are in proportion to the amount of
water entitlements held by each member; that is, water entitlements – in the
form of transferable water entitlement (TWE) certificates – are ‘stapled’ to
members’ ownership shares. Stapled securities are created when two or more
rights are contractually bound together – in this case, water entitlements and
cooperative shares – so that they cannot be sold separately. There are no shares
issued to members by Coleambally’s mutual (CIMCL) and irrigators are treated
strictly as members, not shareholders, as required by NSW law. The annual
contributions paid by each member are based on the water entitlements held
in CICL access licences; in SWIMCO, they are based on the number of shares
held. All shares have a constant, fully paid value of $1 each. Each member in
the trading cooperatives and mutuals has one vote regardless of the number of
shares held.
The trading cooperatives have adopted active membership rules stipulating
that shares must be redeemed in less than three years if shareholders do not use
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Table 1. Property rights characteristics of alternative ownership structures
Open corporation Traditional cooperative
Single-structured
corporations law irrigation
services cooperatives
Dual-structured
irrigation services
cooperatives
Assignment of residual claims To investors To member-patrons To member-patrons To member-patrons
Separation of ownership from
other functions
Yes No No No
Control rights Voting rights
proportional to
shareholdings
Non-proportional voting rights Either limited voting rights
proportional to
shareholdings or
non-proportional voting
rights
Non-proportional
voting rights
Residual claims and patronage Not tied Tied, but not proportional Either not tied or tied and
proportional
Tied and proportional
Transferability of residual claims Yes No Either Yes or No Yes
Horizon of residual claims Unlimited As long as patron Either unlimited or as long
as patron
Unlimited
Redeemability of residual claims No At the discretion of the Board At the discretion of the
Board
Effectively No
Separation of long-term
ownership / management of
fixed assets from short-term
management / trading
functions
No No No Yes
Source: Adapted from Chaddad and Cook (2004).
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Figure 1. Organizational design characteristics of dual-structured irrigation cooperatives
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entitlements to trade. In addition, sharesmust be redeemed at par value andwater
entitlements at market value. The water could be retained by the cooperative or
sold. However, shares and water entitlements have not been redeemed because
active secondarymarkets exist for water entitlements and consequently the shares
‘stapled’ to them.
Contributions from members received by mutuals form a common fund to
provide goods and services in pursuit of a common objective and are not
treated as assessable income; they are treated as mutual receipts. Any funds
that are not member contributions, but income from those funds, are taxable.
This long-enshrined common law principle is based on the proposition that a
taxpayer cannot derive income from itself. Specifically, if members contribute
to a common fund created and controlled by them for a common purpose, and
those contributing members are essentially the same as those who participate
in the fund, then member contributions and receipts from member dealings
are not taxable income. This mutuality principle has formed the basis of many
cooperative insurance entities and mutual banking organizations, such as credit
unions and building societies.
Equity capital in the dual-structured irrigation cooperatives is permanent
because trading of shares provides liquidity for members’ equity without creating
the need for cash outlays in the form of equity redemption. In addition, most
equity capital in the irrigation cooperatives is not allocated to individual member
accounts. The value of unallocated equity in CIMCL is 100% of total equity,
while it is nearly 99% in SWIAC as shares represent only 1% of total equity.
The proportion of unallocated equity in the trading cooperatives (CICL and
SWIMCO) is above 90%.
Investments in water efficient infrastructure result in one or more of the
following benefits tomembers: lower operating costs for the trading cooperatives;
increases in water availability to members for additional farm use or sale in
temporary (i.e. rent or lease) markets; reduction in associated water costs at
farm level; or the adoption of new, farm-level technology.
Table 1 indicates that the key difference between the property rights
structure of the single-structured and dual-structured irrigation cooperative is
the separation of long-term management and ownership of fixed assets from
short-termmanagement and trading functions; that is, while the single-structured
irrigation services cooperative may be structured to deal with the afore discussed
property rights difficulties associated with the traditional open cooperative
structure, it lacks the additional efficiency gained from the protection of its
core assets afforded by the dual structure.
Reasons for adopting the dual structure
Irrigation cooperatives typically make provisions for asset renewal. For instance,
the 2007 annual report of Murray Irrigation Ltd – a ‘corporate’ single structure
cooperative – indicates that it charges for asset renewal andmaintenance and that
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its asset renewal reserve grew by 13% in that year. At issue is whether the dual
structure offers additional incentives encouraging a pattern of higher investment
over time. The organizational innovation (i.e. the dual structure) emerged in WA
and was subsequently adopted by Coleambally for three main reasons as follows.
Dual structure advantage one
First, and most importantly, they judged the dual structure as a better means
of lowering the risk to their irrigation assets, as a balance is struck between
the conflicting objectives of long-term asset renewal and short-term financial
pressure. Under government ownership and control, irrigation entities had
experienced constant pressure from irrigators to charge inadequate water prices
and not to retain capital to build investment funds because irrigators were
suspicious that retained capital would be diverted to government-consolidated
revenue. While private ownership improved incentives to lift water prices and
retain capital – as the irrigators themselves now owned the assets – pressures to
lower prices, reduce expenditures on asset maintenance and new capital items,
and eat into accumulated reserves remain, particularly during periods of financial
stress for irrigators such as a period of extended drought. At issue is whether the
dual structure better insulates the business from these pressures.
The better balance between the conflicting objectives of long-term asset
renewal and short-term financial pressure results from separating the operating
boards of the asset mutual and the trading cooperative, which allows them
to focus on each of these objectives respectively. The entities, however, retain
common memberships. The mutual cooperatives’ sole obligation to members
is to ensure long-term infrastructure provision. As non-trading, non-borrowing
asset mutual entities, they operate on the basis of minimum financial risk. This is
opposed to a shorter horizon of trading conditions, which in turn are determined
by the need for operational efficiency, interaction with government entities, and,
most importantly, shareholder pressure for the lowest possible price structure. As
a result, raising capital to maintain asset renewal and to fund additional capital
expenditures could be problematic in the trading cooperative, particularly during
times of financial stress. Further, the existing asset renewal and maintenance
investment pool is not put at risk by immediate financial pressures that may
periodically arise for the trading cooperative from shareholders to minimize
water prices charged to members.
The steady provisioning of sinking funds ensures that capital is available to
deal with the lumpy nature of irrigation asset investment, which is around 10–20
times normal yearly expenditure every 25 years (Figure 2). This suggests that a
very low discount rate is used to generate a return on capital sufficient to justify
investment. This low implied rate of return is consistent with the objective of
maintaining the value of farm assets, which is historically a common objective
of many agricultural cooperatives (Cook and Plunkett, 2006). In other words,
risk-bearing costs are relatively low in the mutual.
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Figure 2. Coleambally’s pattern of irrigation asset replacement expenditures
Source: CICL (2006).
Coleambally mutual’s 2005 annual report indicates that it carried no debt
and total liabilities were 2% of total assets. Similarly, Harvey Water’s mutual
carried no debt and its total liabilities – primarily deferred tax – were 23% of
total assets in 2006. Reducing risk to the irrigation assets means that the return
to these assets can be further lowered when considering irrigation investment
decisions. Again, this is another indication of relatively low risk-bearing costs
to the owners. Indeed the mutuals’ objective is to break even over time and also
to build funds at a replacement cost rate of depreciation. A mutual with no
debt and relatively young assets will build cash reserves for future expenditure
relative to a mutual with no debt and older assets requiring more immediate
expenditure. Therefore, Coleambally mutual’s 2005 return on total investment
of 24% – measured as the ratio EBIT/Shareholder’s Equity – should be viewed in
context of building reserves for the long-term pattern of investment as illustrated
in Figure 2. Additionally, this ratio might be considered inflated because the
scheme’s irrigation assets are only transferred to the mutual as the assets are
replaced.
Harvey Water mutual’s return on total investment is 4.6% as it holds the
bulk of the irrigation assets; the trading cooperative holds new assets that are
transferred to the mutual as the debt on them is paid. Harvey Water’s assets are
older than Coleambally’s (SWIMCO, 2006). Coleambally’s 2004 annual report
indicates that 75% of the mutual’s non-current assets – in particular, the sinking
fund for future asset replacement – are invested in financial assets that are often
characterized as low risk (e.g., balanced and diversified funds) and 25% is held in
a capital growth instrument. These types of investments are reflective of long time
horizons. Harvey mutual’s financial investments are very low risk – primarily
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deposits yielding 5–6% p.a. (SWIAC, 2006) – as it requires funds sooner than
Coleambally.
Dual structure advantage two
The second benefit of the dual structure is tax effectiveness. This is because the
single entity structures must pay corporate tax of 30% on profits retained to
build their asset renewal funds. Coleambally estimated that, if taxed similarly
to ‘corporate’ cooperative irrigation structures, its tax liabilities would have
increased by $1.5m over the first five years of its existence (CIMCL, 2004).
Harvey Water mutual’s weighted average effective tax rate was 6% in 2006 and
9% in 2005 (SWIAC, 2006). It estimated that the possible loss of its mutual
status in 2004 would have increased its tax liability by around $1.1m.
Dual structure advantage three
The third benefit is that the dual structure sharpens the transparency between
asset management and trading management functions. Each entity has a separate
board of directors with clearly demarcated functions. The relationship between
the two entities, in which day-to-day asset management is delegated from
the mutual to the trading cooperative, is defined by a formal agreement. In
Coleambally’s case, a periodic Due Diligence Report by the mutual’s board
on the performance of the trading cooperative’s management is carried out.
Increased transparency and clearly defined roles for agents with decision control
rights suggest that the dual-structured cooperatives might be able to ameliorate
collective decision-making and management monitoring costs, which are the
other forms of ownership costs (Hansmann, 1996).
In keeping with Harvey and Coleambally mutuals’ long-term infrastructure
focus, actuarial and engineering reports into the schemes’ infrastructure needs
are commissioned. Perhaps more importantly, the asset mutual entities do not
borrow funds or engage in any activity of significant legal or financial risk. While
equity funding avoids the additional cost associated with debt funding, the aim
is for each generation to pay for the use of the asset at the time of its use.4
The mutuals do not directly employ staff but engage services as needed on
a contract basis. They have independent boards of directors, which include
external, non-member specialists. In addition to planning asset expenditure, their
only other function is to manage members’ contributed funds. Income earned on
4 Conversely, it should be expected that the trading cooperative will have comparatively few assets and
its implied rate of return should be higher. This will be the case for Coleambally’s trading cooperative
in time as it transfers its assets to the mutual upon renewal; its return on total investment is currently
3.2%. Upon transfer to local ownership, Harvey Water’s irrigation assets were placed in its mutual. In
2006, Harvey Water’s trading cooperative and mutual had respective total equities of $8M and $41M.
Harvey Water trading cooperative’s return on total investment was 91% in 2006, which reflects the first
tranche of water transfers to the WA Water Corporation’s integrated water supply system in exchange
for funding for pressurized piping. Its ratio of total liabilities to total assets in 2006 was 71%, the bulk
of which was debt.
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the investment of members’ funds or on income from mutual assets is taxable
(SWIAC, 2005).
The trading cooperatives are licensed to undertake to take management
functions. They employ all staff; provide all water delivery and asset management
services; provide day-to-day management of the irrigation system, including
ensuring water licence compliance; and carry out asset works and other
management functions such as levy collection on behalf of the mutuals under
contract. Should the trading cooperatives fail, the members could replace them
with other service providers. The trading cooperatives make recommendations
to the mutuals with respect to the program of works, but it is the mutuals’
responsibility to review proposals, obtain independent advice, and determine the
ultimate program of works (CIMCL, 2006). The mutuals may also invite other
parties to submit proposals to undertake works programs.
Lower risk-bearing costs and increased investment
Harvey Water has invested a total of $18m of its members’ mutual contributions
towards its system upgrades since privatization in 1996. In 1999, the cooperative
decided to substitute its channel water delivery system to a superior, gravity-fed,
and semi-pressurized piped system. By 2001, it had begun replacing channels
with piping and demonstrated the efficiency of the new system as it has reduced
water delivery losses from 30% to 2% in the Waroona district. In 2004, it put
a proposal to the State government to trade 17gl (gigalitres) of water savings in
return for funding a greatly augmented expansion of the piping system. Collective
selling of water to the WA Water Corporation’s integrated water supply system
(IWSS) has relieved the cooperative from the need to source additional member
funds for the project. The improved delivery made possible by piping has spurred
a threefold increase in horticulture output in the area. In addition, it could
potentially trade a further 22gl of water from the Collie system, with investment
in treatment and interconnecting piping, without affecting its ability to service
irrigation demand. The Collie district is not yet connected to the IWSS.
Coleambally’s self-funded $14.2m investment in its ‘total channel control’
(TCC) system between 2002 and 2006 and the subsequent temporary sale by in-
dividual members of more than 40gl of saved water down theMurray in 2006/07
also suggest that the dual cooperative structure provides investment incentives for
members and thus ameliorates risk-bearing costs. Around 27% of Coleambally’s
TCC investment was from its legacy funding;5 20%was from sale of saved water
to members, and the balance was from equity capital reserves. In mid-2006, it
permanently traded 3.5gl of its water savings for $4.9m to the government-
sponsored program known as Water for Rivers. The Waters for Rivers program
5 Funding provided by irrigators to government for future capital works when the schemes were
government owned and controlled. Coleambally took its legacy funding as a discounted lump sum upon
privatization.
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has the objective of securing water entitlements to ensure minimum flows for
environmental purposes. In doing so, Coleambally was able to fund the final
stage of its TCC system. Individual members temporarily traded their water
savings for up to $500/ml (million litres) in 2006/07. Members are able to
leverage their largely annual crop production by becoming water providers to
livestock and perennial producers elsewhere in the river system in dry years.
Coleambally’s members have been able to trade water either on a permanent
or temporary basis with external buyers since late 2006. This is in common with
other irrigation schemes as stipulated by the National Water Initiative (NWI).
Permanent trades are limited to 4% per year of the total bulk water entitlement
until 2014 when unlimited trading will be permitted, as stipulated by the terms of
the NWI. No permanent water was externally traded in 2006/07 from Coleam-
bally, which is unsurprising given the small premium paid for it. This premium
may rise if a recent report’s recommendations (ACCC, 2006) are adopted to
unbundle water and delivery rights and introduce progressively reducing the fees
irrigator entities may charge when water is permanently traded outside their
schemes (i.e., termination fees). Rising permanent water values may result in
greater propensity to permanently trade water around the Murray River system.
Harvey Water does not permit members to sell water to external users as it
argues that the market power of a dominant buyer (the WAWater Corporation)
increases the likelihood that the collective value of the asset would not be attained
in negotiations.6 Secondly, it argues that the largest water efficiency gains are to
be realized from collective investment in further upgrading the irrigation system,
which is a necessary condition for the adoption of further on-farm water efficient
technology. Indeed, Myer (2005) indicates that upgrading to semi-pressurized
piping, as Harvey has done in the Waroona area, can result in a 40% reduction
in annual delivery volumes, as there is incentive for landowners to invest in
synergistic on-farm application systems, such as drip irrigation.
Investment in water-saving irrigation technology as a means of re-establishing
adequate environmental flows along river systems and maintaining water for
irrigated production and urban needs is controversial. Firstly, this is because
surface water saved from seepage and channel leaks may be lost to the ground
water portion of a river system, which is complicated by the poorly understood
interaction between surface and ground water systems. Young and McColl
(2003) argue that river system-wide water accounting is required to balance
losses to the system from all types of water interception and that water trading
should be structured to account for these impacts. This underpins the need for
necessary and timely investment into mapping and understanding the physical
6 Indeed, Libecap (2007) suggests that the formation of a single water seller to bargain with the City of
Los Angles would have redressed the distributional issues that raised the transaction costs of transferring
water from low-value agricultural uses to high-value urban uses in the famous ‘China Town’ episode of
the 1920s.
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dimensions of the river system so that accurate water accounting can occur.
The Australian Federal Government’s 2007 National Plan for Water Security
(the Plan) provides funding to generate such data. Young and McColl (2003)
also argue that contracts from government involving funding of water-saving
investment should result in the surrender of part, or all, of the water license to
environmental flow. The Government’s Plan also stipulates that half of water
savings resulting from federal investment grants will be directed to environmental
flows with the other half retained by irrigators. Obviously, at issue is whether
this will be the correct proportion, further underpinning the need for accurately
establishing the physical dimensions of river systems. In addition, Grafton et al.
(2007) argue that public funds should not be used to pay for investment that
irrigators would have provided for themselves. The irrigation projects discussed
in this paper have not received grants, but the subsidization of any irrigation
project is apparently not in keeping with the 1994 COAG Agreement to move
to full cost recovery.
4. Analysis of the dual structure
This section examines how the organizational design characteristics adopted
in the dual-structured irrigation cooperatives increase incentives for members
to invest and reduce their risk-bearing costs. The combination of ‘stapling’
or linking tradable water entitlements to ownership shares and the active
membership provisions in dual-structured irrigation cooperatives helps to
limit the emergence of a free-rider problem in capital provision, as capital
contributions are proportionally linked to asset use by members. In doing so,
‘proportional equivalence’ between benefits and costs may be achieved – one of
the ‘design principles’ of long-enduring irrigation institutions (Ostrom, 1993).
The introduction of disaggregated (discretionary) pricing would further assist in
aligning service costs and pricing and thus further tighten the alignment between
residual claimants and residual decision makers.
The trading cooperatives’ equity capital is largely permanent given the
very high proportion of unallocated (or common pool) reserves to equity.
Additionally, internal trading of shares provides liquidity to shareholders without
creating the need for capital outlays in the form of equity redemption – the
most commonly used method in traditional cooperatives. Further, if water
entitlements were to be redeemed, the cooperative would do so at market value
and in turn would receive an asset that could be sold. As the tradable water
entitlements to which shares are ‘stapled’ are appreciable, the generic private
business problem of exitingmembers extracting some value from their investment
appears to be ameliorated. These features suggest the trading cooperatives are
well structured for risky strategies, as increases in the value from water trading
(price and available volume) can be captured by members directly when trading
internally, indirectly via the cooperative when it trades externally and invests
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in water-saving assets, or directly by members in Coleambally’s case – that is,
transferability and appreciability of water rights proportionally tied to shares
help to ameliorate horizon and portfolio problems.
The unique key feature, however, of separating the business into two
structures suggests that fixed irrigation assets are protected from any potential
failure that may arise from higher risk activities engaged in by the trading
cooperatives and that investments in ongoing maintenance can be better shielded
in periods of member financial distress. Further, the contractual relationship
between the mutual entities and the trading cooperatives in Coleambally
and Harvey Water permits the value created by the tax effective structure
to optimize the benefit to the common membership of the dual-structured
cooperatives. This organizational innovation apparently further ameliorates
organization costs inefficiencies fostered by portfolio, horizon, and free-rider
investment constraints. The portfolio constraint is mitigated, as different risk
classes of investment decisions are unbundled according to a formal and
transparent process that assesses the mutual investment needs via the use of
third-party (external) engineering and actuarial services. The horizon constraint
is ameliorated because the tax effectiveness of the sinking fund redresses the
low returns available from very long lead times inherent in water infrastructure
investment. In other words, a very low discount rate must be employed to justify
investment with long lead times. The free-rider constraint is further ameliorated
because the mutuality induced tax effectiveness also encourages investments in
infrastructure with a large public goods component.
In sum, amelioration of free-rider, horizon, and portfolio problems results in
lower risk-bearing costs, which suggests organizational efficiency gains in terms
of reduced costs of ownership; that is, the organizational design characteristics
of the dual-structured irrigation cooperatives suggest that, all other things being
equal, these structures should have a higher rate of capital formation than
alternative ownership structures to fund irrigation construction andmaintenance
projects. Perhaps more importantly, the costs of constructing, operating, and
maintaining these irrigation systems are roughly proportional to the benefits
that irrigators obtain from their cooperatives.
Rising water prices provides a market signal to invest in water-saving
technology, which further ameliorates capital formation constraints. However,
rising water prices could also lead to an increase in internal conflicts among
members as retiring irrigators may view an opportunity to individually sell
permanently to higher priced markets as more attractive than selling into lower
value markets within the existing bulk allocation structure.
5. Summary and conclusions
The purpose of this paper is to examine the property rights attributes and
attendant risk-bearing costs of two Australian dual-structured irrigation supply
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entities and compare them with single-level user-owned irrigation systems. The
alignment of residual control rights with residual claimant rights is the basis
for ameliorating conflicts of interest in capital provision and thus reducing
risk-bearing costs. We observe that the trading cooperatives’ active member
provisions in its articles and its practice of aligning capital to patronage
loosely align these residual rights. While this suggests a reasonably efficient
organizational design to mobilize financial resources for irrigation system
construction, maintenance, and operation, conflicts of interest over the extent
of fees paid when permanently trading water within Coleambally may emerge
between members preferring different water trading strategies because of the
public good nature of irrigation provision. This suggests that some parts of
irrigation schemes may become ‘unserviceable’ if sufficient volumes of water
are traded out of the system, which suggests the need for disaggregated water
service delivery pricing. Within both structures, scope apparently exists for
greater alignment between residual claimant and residual control rights by the
introduction of differential pricing in whichmembers are charged prices reflective
of actual, rather than pooled costs.
The relationship of the asset mutual entities with their respective trading coop-
eratives provides a conduit for members to capture the value created in the non-
distributing mutual. These structural alignments imply that the dual-structured
cooperatives should not face a binding capital formation constraint, and this is
supported by their self-funded investment in water-saving technology, which has
increased the water volume available to members for irrigation use or sale and
permits the adoption of additional investment inwater efficiency at the farm level.
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